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CASE SUMMARY
NORDSTROM V. RYAN:
INMATE’S LEGAL CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN HIS OR HER ATTORNEY
IS STILL CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED
CHRISTINA ONTIVEROS*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution guarantees certain enumerated (and
unenumerated) fundamental rights1 to its citizens, regardless of socioeco-
nomic status, religion, race, or gender.2 However, these constitutional
rights are not absolute. This means that the federal, state, and local gov-
ernment can place restrictions on these constitutional rights so long as
those restrictions are constitutionally valid. For a law that infringes on a
fundamental right to be considered valid under the U.S. Constitution, it
must pass the strict scrutiny test.3 This is the highest legal standard that
the courts apply to legal questions related to fundamental rights. They do
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA; B.A.,
Anthropology and Legal Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA; Executive
Research Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review. I would like to thank my father, mother,
sister, partner, and close friends for their unconditional love and support. I would also like to thank
Professor Eric C. Christiansen and Professor Laura A. Cisneros for igniting in me an intense passion
for constitutional law.
1 Fundamental rights are “rights that have been recognized by the [U.S.] Supreme Court as
requiring a high degree of protection from government encroachment.” CORNELL L. SCH., Funda-
mental Right, LEGAL INFO. INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fundamental_right (last vis-
ited Nov. 4, 2017).
2 U.S. CONST. amends. I-VIII, XIV.
3 A law or regulation will be held constitutionally valid if there is a compelling state interest
and the law or regulation in question is narrowly tailored to achieve said interest, meaning that there
are “no less restrictive means available.” CORNELL L. SCH., Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL INFO. INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
99
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so because fundamental rights are regarded as those that define individu-
als and are related to their very core; that when the government tries to
take that right away or limit it, there is an automatic heightened degree of
protection to ensure these rights are not taken away without adequate
reason.4
Yet there are instances in which a fundamental right allegedly is
being infringed, but because there are two compelling interests at stake,
the strict scrutiny analysis becomes inapplicable. One such instance is
that of prisoners’ constitutional rights. Historically, the courts have fo-
cused more on the accused individuals’ rights rather than those afforded
to convicted individuals,5 in part because the courts have acknowledged
that they are “ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems
of the prison administration and reform . . . [because] the problems of
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and more to the point,
they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.”6 As such, prison
administrations have been given much deference as to the limitations of
prisoners’ rights.7 Still, even though the courts have shown regard to the
prison administration, they have also recognized that there are two im-
portant interests at play: those of the prison administration and that of the
prisoners’ constitutional rights. Because there are two important interests
at play when an issue arises as to a prison’s regulation and its effect on a
prisoner’s constitutional right, the courts turn to the Turner standard8 to
determine the regulation’s constitutionality. Recently, the Ninth Circuit
used this standard in Nordstrom v. Ryan9 to determine whether an Ari-
zona Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) prison official reading an in-
mate’s outgoing legal correspondence to his attorney was a violation of
both his First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights.10 The court
found that both of the prisoner’s constitutional rights were in fact
violated.
4 Fundamental rights are “rights that have been recognized by the [U.S.] Supreme Court as
requiring a high degree of protection from government encroachment.” CORNELL L. SCH., Funda-
mental Right, LEGAL INFO. INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fundamental_right (last vis-
ited Nov. 4, 2017).
5 Richard P. Vogelman, The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science:
Prison Restrictions – Prisoner Rights, Vol. 59, NW. SCH. OF L. 386, 387 (1968).
6 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
7 Richard P. Vogelman, The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science:
Prison Restrictions – Prisoner Rights, Vol. 59, NW. SCH. OF L. 386, 387 (1968).
8
 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
9 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 2017).
10 Id. at 1269.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Scott D. Nordstrom is a Caucasian male11 who was sen-
tenced in 2009 to the death penalty after he was found guilty of killing a
total of six individuals in two separate robberies.12 As such, he was and
is an inmate in a prison run by ADOC.13 Nordstrom alleged during an
otherwise normal routine mailing, he tried to mail a letter containing con-
fidential information to his attorney; instead of simply inspecting the let-
ter (or scanning it) for unauthorized communication of illegal activities
or contraband,14 the prison official read the letter. After about fifteen
seconds, Nordstrom asked the prison official to stop reading his letter, to
which the officer responded, “Don’t tell me how to do my job; I am
authorized to search legal mail for contraband as well as scan the content
of the material to ensure it is of legal subject matter.”15 After Nord-
strom’s repeated requests, the officer stopped reading his letter.16 Based
on this interaction, Nordstrom sued the Arizona Department of Correc-
tions as well as the prison officer in federal court.17
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Before filing with the District Court of Arizona, Nordstrom filed a
formal grievance with ADOC.18 The complaint was denied, based on the
fact that ADOC had the “authority to scan [mail] and is not prohibited
from reading [legal] mail to establish the absence of contraband and en-
sure the content of the mail is of legal subject matter.”19 The only limita-
tion was that the inspection must be “only to the extent necessary” to
11 Arizona Department of Corrections Inmate ID No.: 086114, ARIZ. DEP’T. OF CORREC-
TIONS, https://corrections.az.gov/public-resources/death-row (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
12 Howard Fischer, Capitol Media Services, Arizona Prisons Use Illegal Methods to Check
Inmates’ Mail, Court Rules, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, Nov. 5, 2017, http://tucson.com/news/local/govt-
and-politics/arizona-prisons-use-illegal-methods-to-check-inmates-mail-court/article_9b8d1c11-
00b4-5a49-863f-2f619aa53055.html.
13 Arizona Department of Corrections Inmate ID No.: 086114, ARIZ. DEP’T. OF CORREC-
TIONS, https://corrections.az.gov/public-resources/death-row (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
14 Howard Fischer, Capitol Media Services, Arizona Prisons Use Illegal Methods to Check
Inmates’ Mail, Court Rules, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, Nov. 5, 2017, http://tucson.com/news/local/govt-
and-politics/arizona-prisons-use-illegal-methods-to-check-inmates-mail-court/article_9b8d1c11-
00b4-5a49-863f-2f619aa53055.html.
15 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1268 (9th Cir. 2017).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1269.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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ensure that the mail correspondence contained no contraband and/or to
determine that the legal mail did not contain any talk of illegal activity.20
Due to the denial, Nordstrom filed his lawsuit in federal court
against ADOC and the prison officer pursuant to Title 42 of the United
States Code, Section 1983,21 seeking a declaratory judgment and injunc-
tion against ADOC’s legal mail policy, stating that ADOC violated his
Sixth and First Amendment rights.22 The district court dismissed the
complaint, stating that Nordstrom failed to state a claim.23 The case
reached the Ninth Circuit in 2014 (referred to as Nordstrom I)24 and the
Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court of Arizona’s dismissal of Nord-
strom’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim.25 It also distinguished be-
tween reading legal mail and inspecting the mail in the presence of an
inmate.26 The case was remanded back to the district court for further
proceedings.
In 2016, the district court, in adherence to the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion, looked over Nordstrom’s claim and decided in favor of ADOC,
concluding that its legal mail policy and implementation was constitu-
tionally valid.27 In other words, the district court determined again that
the policy did not violate Nordstrom’s Sixth or First Amendment
rights.28 Fast-forward to 2017, and following Nordstrom’s timely appeal
to the Ninth Circuit, the court once again analyzed and determined the
constitutionality of ADOC’s legal mail policy.
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S LEGAL ANALYSIS IN NORDSTROM V. RYAN
The Ninth Circuit addressed three important points concerning
Nordstrom’s lawsuit. First, the court determined whether Nordstrom had
standing in federal court.29 It then analyzed his claim of a Sixth Amend-
ment violation by ADOC; and finally, the court focused on Nordstrom’s
claim of a First Amendment violation by ADOC.30 Heard before a three-
judge panel, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of
20 Id.
21 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
22 Nordstrom, 856 F.3d at 1269.
23 Id.
24 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014).
25 Id. at 906.
26 Id.
27 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir. 2017).
28 Howard Fischer, Capitol Media Services, Arizona Prisons Use Illegal Methods to Check
Inmates’ Mail, Court Rules, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, Nov. 5, 2017, http://tucson.com/news/local/govt-
and-politics/arizona-prisons-use-illegal-methods-to-check-inmates-mail-court/article_9b8d1c11-
00b4-5a49-863f-2f619aa53055.html.
29 Nordstrom, 856 F.3d at 1269.
30 Id.
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Nordstrom’s Sixth and First Amendment claims, holding that ADOC’s
legal mail policy did not satisfy Nordstrom I’s standard or the Turner
standard, and was therefore unconstitutional. The court further remanded
for the “district court to craft a decree based on the evidence of actual
risks in Arizona state prisons.”31
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CONCLUDES NORDSTROM HAS STANDING TO
BRING HIS SIXTH AND FIRST AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL
CLAIMS
First, the Ninth Circuit focused on whether Nordstrom had standing
to bring his claim to federal court.32 Standing is one of the justiciability
limits that needs to be satisfied in order for the federal court to hear a
plaintiff’s case.33 Specifically, it determines whether a specific person is
the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication.34 A plain-
tiff will be able to show sufficient stake in the controversy only if he can
show an injury in fact, caused by the government that will be remedied
by a decision in his favor.35 In Nordstrom I, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that Nordstrom had standing because it arose from an interest in “en-
joining a practice that chilled his Sixth Amendment rights.”36
On remand, ADOC argued that Nordstrom did not have standing
because given his post-conviction proceedings, he had no constitutional
right to an attorney under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.37 As
such, there was no Sixth Amendment violation and therefore an injunc-
tion would not remedy an injury, given that an injury did not exist.38 The
district court determined Nordstrom had standing at the time the com-
plaint was filed because Nordstrom was involved in criminal proceed-
ings, which attaches the Sixth Amendment right.39 Though the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court’s decision on standing, it noted that
what is vital when considering standing of a plaintiff is not whether he or
she had standing at the time the original complaint was filed but rather
whether he or she has a live controversy (standing) at the present time.40
31 Id. at 1274.
32 Id. at 1271.
33 CORNELL L. SCH., Justiciable, LEGAL INFO. INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
justiciable (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
34 CORNELL L. SCH., Standing, LEGAL INFO. INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
standing (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
35 Id.
36 Nordstrom, 856 F.3d at 1269.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
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Because the case came back to the Ninth Circuit procedurally the same,
the prior conclusion that Nordstrom had standing carried over to this
Ninth Circuit case.
The Ninth Circuit also determined that Nordstrom had standing for
his First Amendment claim, which was not discussed in Nordstrom I.41
Nordstrom had a First Amendment right to “send and receive mail”
while imprisoned.42 That right was being infringed upon by ADOC,
thereby creating an injury.43 A decision in favor of the plaintiff (invali-
dating ADOC’s legal mail policy) would redress Nordstrom’s alleged
injury.44
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CONCLUDES THAT ADOC’S LEGAL MAIL
POLICY VIOLATES INMATES’ SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
Criminal defendants have the right to assistance of counsel under the
Sixth Amendment of the United State Constitution.45 The right to coun-
sel is violated when the “the government deliberately interferes with the
confidential relationship between a criminal defendant and the defense
counsel; and the interference ‘substantially prejudices’ the criminal de-
fendant.”46 It is important for the prisoner to be able to candidly speak to
his or her attorney. This is why prison officials cannot read an inmate’s
outgoing legal correspondence, but they can inspect it to the “extent nec-
essary” to determine if the legal mail correspondence contains anything
illegal.47
Usually when a prison official inspects inmates’ mail, it is to con-
firm that the correspondence does not have a “map of the prison yard, the
time of guards’ shift changes, escape plans, or contraband.”48 The courts
have found that this is appropriate to do49 in order to ensure the safety of
inmates and prison officials and the efficiency of the prison system.50 In
this case, however, the term ‘contraband’ was broadly defined by ADOC
as “any non-legal written correspondence or communication.”51 The
broad definition of the word ‘contraband’ allowed for an inspection im-
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“ . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
46 Nordstrom, 856 F.3d at 1271.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987).
51 Nordstrom, 856 F.3d at 1271.
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permissible under Nordstrom I.52 Instead of limiting the inspection scope
to actual security threats, such as dangerous or illegal items that are hid-
den in legal correspondence (i.e. drugs, or handmade weapons), ADOC’s
legal mail policy extended Nordstrom I’s permissible inspection of in-
mates’ mail.53 As a result, it violated the Sixth Amendment rights of an
inmate.
Concerning Nordstrom, the court found that the ADOC deliberately
interfered with Nordstrom’s attorney-client relationship with his criminal
defense attorney.54 The inspection was a page-by-page read of Nord-
strom’s legal letter,55 which essentially made the original confidential
information between an inmate and his attorney non-confidential. The
court also found that this interference was substantially prejudicial to
Nordstrom, a criminal defendant.56 For the foregoing reasons, the Ninth
Circuit determined that an inmate’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated
by ADOC’s legal mail policy.
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DETERMINES THAT ADOC’S LEGAL MAIL
POLICY ALSO VIOLATES INMATES’ FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT57
Case law demonstrates that the courts have not applied the strict
scrutiny legal standard when it comes to “prisoners’ rights” cases.58 The
court instead follows the four-factor test established in Turner v. Safley59
when determining whether a prison regulation violates the prisoners’
constitutional rights. To determine the constitutionality of a prison regu-
lation that is infringing upon an inmate’s constitutional rights,60 the court
must ask whether there is a
valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legiti-
mate governmental interest put forward to justify it . . . whether there
are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates . . . what impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional
right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1271.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”).
58 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987).
59 Id. at 89.
60 Id.
7
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prison resources generally . . . and whether there is an absence of
ready alternatives.61
Concerning the First Amendment, inmates have the right to “send and
receive mail,”62 but this right can be restricted as long as the regulation
satisfies the Turner standard.
Contrary to the district court’s minimal analysis, the Ninth Circuit
considered all four Turner factors to determine whether Nordstrom’s
First Amendment rights were violated.63 The Ninth Circuit agreed with
the district court that legal mail had the potential of enabling illegal ac-
tivity.64 This potential security threat constituted a legitimate “penologi-
cal interest.”65 However, ADOC was only able to demonstrate that
incoming legal mail could potentially pose a threat to the prison.66 It
failed to procure any evidence that proved outgoing legal mail had been
abused and was being used to further criminal activity.67 In addition, the
court pointed out that outgoing legal mail itself does not create a serious
threat to “prison order and security.”68 Furthermore, ADOC could have
used less restrictive means69 to ensure that the outgoing legal mail did
not constitute a high threat to its prison facility.
ADOC prison officials could have confirmed if the legal mail was
addressed to an existing attorney by cross-referencing the attorney’s
name and address via the state attorney search website.70 Prison officials
could also limit their inspections to drawings or maps rather than read the
letter page-by-page.71 Additionally, the court recognized that though in-
mates did have other means of communication with their attorneys
(phone calls and in-person meetings),72 these alternatives did not dimin-
ish an inmate’s legal right to have his confidential legal mail “free from
unreasonable censorship and the chilling effect of excessive monitor-
ing.”73 Because the Ninth Circuit could not find outgoing legal mail as a
serious threat, it could not reasonably conclude that limiting the prison
61 Nordstrom, 856 F.3d at 1272 (“Additionally, ‘[w]hen a prison regulation affects outgoing
mail as opposed to incoming mail, there must be a closer fit between the regulation and the purpose
it serves.’”).
62 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 2017).
63 Id. at 1273.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1274.
70 Id. at 1273.
71 Id. at 1272.
72 Id. at 1274.
73 Id.
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officials’ authority to only inspecting legal mail would have an adverse
effect on prison staff, facility, and security as a whole.74 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit determined that ADOC’s legal mail policy “unreasonably in-
trudes” on an inmate’s First Amendment rights.75
D. NINTH CIRCUIT’S OVERALL CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit in its 2017 decision determined that ADOC’s le-
gal mail policy violated both Nordstrom’s Sixth and First Amendment
rights. As such, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Nord-
strom’s claim, and remanded for the “district court to craft a decree
based on the evidence of actual risks in Arizona state prisons.”76
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DECISION
A. OUTGOING LEGAL MAIL SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY STRICT
SCRUTINY AND NOT THE TURNER FOUR-FACTOR TEST
BECAUSE THE LESSER STANDARD DOES NOT PROTECT
PRISONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The Ninth Circuit made it clear that it understood the necessity of
applying the Turner standard to prison regulations infringing on prison-
ers’ constitutional rights. The constitutional framework allows for defer-
ence to prison administrations and their policies where appropriate, while
simultaneously taking into account prisoners’ constitutional rights.77 In
other words, the legal standard applied to prison regulations affecting
prisoners’ constitutional rights takes into account the tension that arises
between two legitimate interests, that of the prison administration and the
other of the prisoner. Case law has also demonstrated that this legal stan-
dard is a favored framework,78 one that will most likely not change any-
time soon.
It is important to note that the Turner standard itself is not flawed;
instead, it is the broad application of the standard to inmates’ Sixth and
First Amendment rights when it comes to outgoing legal mail that is
flawed. To begin with, the four-factor test is not protective enough of an
inmate’s constitutional rights. When applying the standard, the courts do
not distinguish79 between a prison regulation limiting a prisoner’s consti-
74 Id. at 1273.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987).
78 Id. at 87.
79 Id. at 88.
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tutional right(s)80 and a prison regulation completely taking81 away a
prisoner’s constitutional right(s).82 Rather than hold the prison regulation
that completely deprives the inmate of his constitutional right to the strict
scrutiny standard, the ‘complete deprivation’ aspect is taken into consid-
eration not as an element but only as a factor under Turner.83 Courts
have thus influenced, albeit indirectly, and intensified the common mis-
conception within the prisons that prisoners have no rights. By declining
to apply the strict scrutiny standard to these instances, the United States
Supreme Court inadvertently protected prison systems at a higher degree
than prisoners’ constitutional rights. The lower courts are thus bound to
follow a constitutional framework that alleviates the natural tension be-
tween the prison administrations need for strict regulations and prison-
ers’ constitutional rights, but does so at the expense of prisoners and their
rights.
Nevertheless, the distinction that the Ninth Circuit made between
inspecting and reading outgoing legal mail is an imperative distinction,84
which serves as a protective layer for prisoners’ constitutional rights
under the Turner standard. Though prison officials can still inspect out-
going legal mail, this clarification that reading an inmate’s outgoing legal
mail is impermissible offers a restriction that the prison administrations
were not providing, or possibly did not think necessary to fortify the
protection of a prisoner’s Sixth and First Amendment rights. At least
with this distinction, a prison official will think twice before reading an
inmate’s outgoing legal mail simply to exert authority over the inmate.
What is more, it acknowledges that an inmate has a right to protect his
confidential information, and simply being imprisoned does not equate to
losing that right. It is important to note that this legal distinction is not as
easily enforced in practice as it is in the court, given the complexities of
the prison system.85 Still, allowing inmates to hold prison officials ac-
countable further conveys the notion that they matter and have rights that
cannot be easily taken away from them.
Additionally, though the Sixth and First Amendment rights pertain-
ing to outgoing legal mail were protected in Nordstrom v. Ryan, it is
important to recognize that the inspections prison officials make may still
curtail and chill these very rights if prison officials are not properly
monitored or regulated. Inspecting legal mail inevitably allows a prison
80 William M. Roth, Turner v. Safley: The Supreme Court Further Confuses Prisoners’ Con-
stitutional Rights, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 667, 692 (1989).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2016).
85 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
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official to have physical possession of the outgoing legal mail. He or she
is able to glance over the mail, and as was briefly mentioned above, there
is no safeguard as to whether this prison official will actually follow the
legal distinction. As such, it could very well be that inmates experienced
a situation such as rape, violence, abuse, that they wish to speak to their
attorney about, and having a prison official inspect a letter containing
such content could not only endanger that prisoner if the prison official
inspecting his or her mail was the aggressor, but could also chill the
disclosure of confidential information because the inmate does not feel
free to speak candidly with his or her attorney. It will be interesting to
see if and when a similar case reaches the Ninth Circuit, if the court will
provide examples of safeguards or find itself in a position in which it will
have to rule on a safeguard and whether it is constitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current constitutional framework established in Turner is the
governing legal standard when it comes to determining whether a prison
regulation is constitutionally valid.86 As the nation slowly moves toward
a pro-prisoners’ rights stance, it seems that in due time the Ninth Circuit,
as well as the United States Supreme Court, will have to accommodate
for that culture change and reevaluate Turner. When that time comes,
both courts will have to decide whether strict scrutiny will be a favorable
legal standard to apply. The Turner standard, though highly important,
adds more questions than it provides solutions for the protection of a
prisoner’s constitutional rights. With strict scrutiny as the legal standard,
at least the burden of proof will automatically fall on the prison adminis-
trations, and as such, maybe having a heightened legal standard to satisfy
will provide for a greater self-assessment when implementing prison reg-
ulations and contemplating their effects on prisoners’ constitutional
rights.
86 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1272 (9th Cir. 2017).
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